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The fact that by admission of Slovenia the borders of the European
Union almost reached Zagreb, repeatedly provoked a discussion about
the reasons of lagging behind of Croatia. The author observes the basic
reasons (beside the imposed war) in political atmosphere which was
unacceptable for international community. Such atmosphere resulted in
big mistakes of the entire (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and economic policy
(tycoon privatization and the wrong stabilization level). Unacceptable
political atmosphere is also shown by the fact that Croatian and Slovenian
economists commonly prepared the starting bases of transition. Slovenia
consistently implemented this concept, while Croatia completely ignored
it. The second wave of democratization (at the beginning of century)
created political atmosphere more acceptable for international
community and more adequate for economic development. Beside certain
progress in economic sphere especially expressed are shifts in direction
of somewhat faster integration into the European Union. In this sense
the author was also encouraged by the President of the European
Commission Romano Prodi at the XIII th World Congress of economists
in Lisbon, September 9 to 13, 2002.
Dragomir Vojnić*
* D. Vojnić, prof. dr. sc., znanstveni savjetnik Ekonomskog instituta, Zagreb (u mirovini)
D. VOJNI∆: European Integration Processes
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 54 (1-2) 157-172 (2003)158
Some general causes of lagging behind of Croatia
Comparing achievements of European countries in transition (within
environment of globalization trends and integration processes and looking for
position of Croatia) one question has been repeatedly imposed. What forces caused
such drastic differences in transitional achievements during the ninetieth between
two countries which were best prepared for realization of economics and politics
of transition. It is a question of Slovenia which has almost become a member of the
European Union and Croatia which will have to wait for this membership for several
years more. Some Slovenian economists have been thinking along the same line of
thought.1
When it is a question of the imposed war, things are more or less clear.
However, when it is a question of economic science things are slightly different.
As a matter of fact it should be remembered that Croatian economists gathered at
the Institute of Economics Zagreb, and Slovenian economists from the Faculty of
Economics and the so-called Bajt’s Institute in Ljubljana, commonly prepared
starting fundamentals of transition.
They started to be implemented already within the Marković’s programme.2
Later on, already at the beginning of 1991, in the Institute of Economics Zagreb
was prepared the study on privatization and development strategy.3 The success of
Slovenians has been based on a fact that they consistently implemented that concept.
The failure of Croatians was the result of complete ignorance of that concept. That
could be explained neither by the imposed war nor by the explosion of the Balkan
nationalism.
The reasons are related to political sphere and the relations within political
powers. Although the reform powers both within League of Communists of Slovenia
and League of Communists of Croatia were very active and they completely
supported reform-oriented economic science, the achievements in both countries
were essentially different. Let me mention by the way that reform bases for the so-
called First Conference of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia which gave
the green light for general pluralization and democratization had been prepared in
the Institute of Economics Zagreb, at the session which was moderated by Štefan
1 Jože Mencinger: The Benefits of Ignoring IMF, Ekonomski pregled, No. 3-4,2002
2 Ante Marković was the last president of the Government of the former state. In 1989 that
Government began the process of transition, pluralization and democratization.
3 Marendić,B., Škegro, B.et.al. (eds.) (1992): “Conception and Strategy of Economic
Development of the Republic of Croatia”, in: Current Economic Development and Economic Policy
of Croatia, No.10, National Bank of Croatia and the Institute of Economics Zagreb; Zduni?, Stjepan
(ed.et.al.): Privatization in the Policy of Economic Development of Croatia, Institute of Economics
Zagreb. 1991.
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Korošec (Slovenian) as the secretary of the Central Committee of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia, and me as director of the Institute of Economics Zagreb.
At this conference participated Ante Marković as the president of the Presidency
of the Republic of Croatia, Ante Milović as the president of the Government of the
Republic of Croatia, Janez Zemljar (Slovenian) as the vice president of the Federal
government, Božo Marendić who was my deputy for years, as well as many other
scientists and politicians.
In Slovenia pluralistic democratic changes made political atmosphere very
similar to that one of developed countries of Europe. In Croatia at the same time
was created political atmosphere very different from one of the west countries.
That was the result of too strong influence of a part of Croatian diaspora which was
not only very right but pro-Ustasha oriented. Consequently Croatia was faced with
international isolation and during the ninetieth it was under shadow sanctions.
Mistakes of economic policy in the light of exchange
rates deviations indices
In such macropolitical environment appeared also mistakes of economic policy
as it was tycoon privatization and mistaken stabilization level which directed entire
economic flows to the wrong way. Instead of application of the economic model
based on development of production and exports expansion, the mistaken
stabilization level directed current economic development to the trade and imports
expansion. All measures of economic policy were predominantly directed to stability
of prices and mistaken exchange rate level, while all other tasks were left behind.
Under such economic conditions instead of enterprise restructuring it followed its
destruction, suppression and extinguishing, and consequently mass bankruptcies
and permanent increase of army of unemployed. Industrial production was almost
halved, and the entire production (as distinguished from all other Central European
countries which much more surpassed pretransitional level) achieved in 2001 the
index of 90.3 (Table 1).
Cumulated problems during the ninetieth (except high unemployment) were
especially related to big illiquidity, high level of premature Europeanization, big
role of foreign exchange clauses, too wide price ranges of domestic and foreign
money, small investments (in particular years smaller than depreciation),
unfavourable property structure especially in
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banking complex which is dominantly in hands of foreigners, and everything
connected with such a state of affairs. Under such circumstances Croatia omitted
the most attractive foreign direct, especially green field, investments. One of
synthetic expressions of cumulated problems is very low competitiveness. That
could be also illustrated by comparison of exchange rate deviation indices what
will be discussed later on (Table 2). By the way I would like to mention the warnings
suggested by the Vienna Institute’s scientists in their last, recently published study,
that such development model could be maintained only for a certain time, but only
under the condition of continued disindustrialization. Phenomenon of
disindustrialization is especially manifested in low level of industrial production
(Index 60.3).
Table 2.
INDICES OF THE RATE OF EXCHANGE DEVIATIONS
(ERDI/EUR BASED)
Source: WIIW database incorporating national statistics, forecast: WIIW. This
table has been constructed on the basis of the study: Leon Podkaminer et al.
Transition Countries in 2002: Losing Steam, Vienna Institute for International
Economic Studies (WIIW), Research Reports No. 285.  July 2002.
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The result of this phenomenon ( i.e. disindustrialization) is high unemployment
level (23.1) as well as high foreign trade balance deficit (- 4914 mn EUR). However,
it is especially interesting to consider the movement of exchange rate deviation
indices . This complex is especially important for a small country which develops
the model of open market economy. In respect to that I would like to mention that
at the beginning of preparation of the reform from 1965, was established the Federal
Commission for the dinar parity. That Commission headed by Kiro Gligorov was
founded in 1962. I was nominated into this Commission as the representative of
economic science from Croatia . All problems related to the role and place of the
exchange rate and its influence to relative prices which were discussed in that time
are also very actual nowadays. Less developed country must conduct the policy of
appreciated currency. The measure of this appreciation is double determined. One
side of this determination must ensure the pressure of foreign competitiveness aimed
to entire restructuring of domestic enterprises and based on this the increase of
their economic efficiency. The other side of this determination must prevent foreign
competitiveness to cause, instead of restructuring, massive suppression and
bankruptcy of domestic enterprises. As a matter of fact, it is a question of searching
for some optimal relations between foreign and domestic global labour productivity.
If these differences are taken too much into consideration there are no pressures of
foreign competitiveness in direction of restructuring. And vice versa. If these
differences are underestimated it appears too big appreciation and suppression of
domestic economy. Such processes started with us at the very beginning of
realization of antiinflationary programme in October 1993. In 1993 the exchange
rate deviation index was 2,14. The parity of German mark and Croatian dinar (HRD)
was 1 : 4.444. However, after strong appreciation the exchange rate deviation index
declined to 1.72 in 1994.Some relations known from theory and practice should be
remembered here. The exchange rate deviation index is that much higher as bigger
is difference of the development level between a country for which the measurement
is made and a country in the currency of which this measurement is expressed
(USD or EUR). The movement of exchange rates deviation indices expresses such
relations as the level of Croatian economy is the highest in comparison with all
countries in transition. However, the real situation is essentially different. Differences
are especially drastic in relation to Slovenia which is more than twice more
developed than Croatia, and which has higher exchange rates deviation indices. It
is indicative that kuna also continued its appreciation in 2001, while depreciation
happens in Slovenia. Such relations show that something is wrong in the economic
system as a whole. What is wrong is generally known. Mistaken is the model of
economy established on diametrically opposed premises, known from theory and
practice. The model is based on the trade development and the imports expansion
instead on the production development and the exports expansion. This model is
the consequence of already mentioned political atmosphere, tycoon privatization
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and mistaken stabilization level. In any case unusual behaviour of exchange rate
deviation indices expresses cumulated mistakes of economic policy during the
ninetieth. However, more remarkable changes in economic policy have not been
noticed so far.
Macroeconomic and macropolitical environment
at the beginning of the new century
New coalition government of the left centre which after election at the
beginning of 2000 came into power, was faced with a lot of difficulties in its trying
to overcome the cumulated problems during the ninetieth and to find some way
out. Especially heavy problems, were and remained, connected not only to economic
but also to deep moral crisis. Very strong social problems are the consequence of a
fact that according to the World Bank study, Croatia belongs to countries with the
most uneven income distribution.4 Due to all this, the problems of functioning of
social and law-governed state and realization of social justice principles are more
than actual. This is all followed, not as less important but just the opposite, by
cumulated problems of the organized crime and mafiacracy. The activity of known
and unknown centres of power, often under the motto the worse the better, is the
part of existing macroeconomic and macropolitical environment. Some
manifestations of the reform of the welfare society especially in the sphere of
searching more flexible solution in the labour market complex additionally
complicated this contradictory macroeconomic and macropolitical environment.
The efforts are directed to searching for some consensus with social partners,
government, trade unions and employers, but with changeable success. Such
occurences, although unavoidable, are still additionally very inconvenient for the
government of the left centre. I had foreseen such occurences (having in mind the
case of Germany) much earlier than they started.
New government of the left centre payed the biggest attention to the inclusion
into the European integration processes. The international position of Croatia has
been essentially improved. Based on the signed Agreement on stability and
association, Croatia should very soon become a candidate for integration into the
European Union. Altogether, this is surely the biggest success of the new coalition
governement of the left centre.
New government realized that one of the basic questions in economy was
connected to increase of competitiveness. It decided upon three main segments in
4 M. Bisogno (and group of authors from the World Bank, Government Statistical Office and
the Institute of Economics Zagreb): Croatia: Economic vulnerability and welfare study, World Bank
document, June 2000
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realization of this policy. The first refers to policy of entire restructuring. The second
refers to monetary and the third to fiscal policy. Certain results have been achieved
in all three spheres. There are observed shifts in investment consumption and quality
increase of the economic growth. Unit labour costs decrease in some parts of
industry, what means that movement of labour productivity is faster than the increase
of real wages, as well as a series of positive movements in this sense.5
In monetary policy especially should be observed the rate of interest decrease
and increase of the credit potential for investments. However, besides the activity
of some educational and managerial centres, the proper investment shift based on
massive entrepreneurial initiatives with the consequence of faster employment
increase has not appeared so far. Dominant slogan is the lack of good projects,
because assets for good projects are always found. This is surely a part of the truth.
There is however the other part of thruth. Big credit foreign exchange and kuna
potential in banking system is based on saving of Croatian citizens and this is their
property. However when this saving is converted into banking capital this is no
more Croatian, but mostly foreign capital.
Managing of this capital depends upon other, and not Croatian centres of
power. So far have been manifested the same tendencies as in earlier years. You are
always welcome and promptly accepted for credit for car. Situation is completely
different if you search credit for extension of existing and beginning of new projects
as an entrepreneur. Beside all stories about general climate which increases risk (in
which is surely a part of the truth) one can hardly get rid of impression that it is
nevertheless a question of property structure of banking capital which is not Croatian.
These property aspects of problems will probably appear in somewhat different
light when Croatia becomes a member of the European Union. But that should be
met under conditions when it is not certain that such property structure of banking
capital, and even restriction of monetary sovereignty, helps this to happen as soon
as possible.
Certain shifts more or less known in fiscal, budget and tax policy have been
also realized. Decrease of illiquidity should be especially pointed out.
Altogether, new coalition government of the left centre realized some shifts,
but insufficient.
It can be only guessed what are the reasons of not realizing more. It certainly
is coalition government, and democracy is known to have its price. For me stays
one dilemma at least, which refers to relations of political powers, including also
known and uknown centres of power.
5 More detailed in Nikić, Gorazd: Strukturne promjene u prerađivačkoj industriji (“Structural
changes in manufacturing industry of Croatia”), Ekonomski pregled, No. 1-2, Zagreb 2002, pp 191-
255
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Having all this in mind I wrote at the very beginning of the new government
of the left centre, that due to the cumulative problems during the ninetieth, it found
itself in the position of certain internee who hardly finds its way out.
Although it can be said now that certain solutions have been found, the results
are nevertheless modest. The present situation is the result of cumulated problems
connected with two groups (having also in mind the mentioned structure of political
powers) of mistakes. The first refers to tycoon privatization and the second to the
wrong stabilization level. Economic policy pointed out, at least verbally, the first
group of mistakes. The second group of problems did not have any treatment. The
wrong stabilization level was not treated as the problem but as an advantage.
Therefore this government is still faced with open problems of how to increase
production and the exports and how to decrease unemployment. The fundamental
precondition of all this is the competitiveness increase. This is in connection with
the main question whether more expressive competitiveness increase is possible
with continuation of such monetary and exchange rate policy, at least if we desire
full employment. It is especially interesting to consider here the movement of
exchange rates deviation index (Table 2).
It is known from theory and practice that with GDP growth rate of 3-4 percent
this can hardly be achieved. Consequently higher growth rate is needed, that is
more active economic policy. Some recent measures of government directed to
searching for possibilty for growth rate increase by means of more active economic,
especially investment policy, show that government has decided, at least to certain
extent, to abandon the policy of uncritical application of economic neliberalism
doctrine, including here the policy of wild capitalism and market fundamentalism.
The government found itself relatively well in some activities imposed by the welfare
society reform (in the sphere of pension and health service, education, science,
defence and police ). However, the most actual problems of judiciary reform closely
correlated to the function of legal state, especially in regard to fight against organized
crime and mafiacracy, are still open. As I personally wrote and predicted several
years ago the fighting against organized crime and mafiacracy would be one of the
most difficult problems. Hard problems also appear in looking for more elastic
solutions in labour market sphere. Beside tensions of these problems it should be
expected that new labour act will be adopted in Croatian parliament based on social
partners consensus.
However it should be repeated that one of the main strategic tasks of economic
policy is connected with transformation of the existing model of the economic
development. The past undertaken measures (of general restructuring) have given
some, but still rather moderate results. Combination of measures of monetary and
fiscal policy had some but insufficient shifts. Consumption still moves out of
possibilities of production. Those who draw attention to Argentine syndrom perhaps
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a little bit exaggerated (in regard to existing reserves both foreign exchange and
privatization), but all possible consequences should be comprehended in time.
Finally only accelerated development, including also more active industrial policy,
can satisfy Croatian ambitions for faster integration into the European Union.
Looking for adequate solutions it is also useful to use the experiences of more
successful neighbours.
Hungary is a good example for us, but the best is Slovenia. This last one
especially when it is a question of protection from uncritical application of the
economic neoliberalism doctrine. In such orientation the coalition government of
the left centre should be also supported by Croatian economic science.
I used to repeat in public many times that since Ministry of development was
abolished, what was wrong, it would be necessary to form better institutional
presumption for more efficient collaboration of economic science and economic
policy. In this sense it is necessary to revitalize such institutions as Economic
Planning Institute and Institute for Macroeconomic Analyses and Forecasts. These
institutions should continually deal with conception and strategy of development
in collaboration with economic science.
Croatia and the European Union
I repeat again that beside Slovenia, Croatia was best prepared for transition. It
happened however, due to known historical circumstances during the ninetieth,
that Slovenia was on the top of countries which would already very soon associate
the European Union, while Croatia was and still is among the last countries of this
group. This position is both inadequate and unjust for Croatia, the more so as already
at the Conference of economists of the European Union in September 1994
(University of Exeter) in Great Britain, where I personally participated, criteria for
integration into the European Union started to change. 6
Economic criteria dominated during the European Community. Later on
(probably under the influence of explosion of Balkan nationalism) political criteria
started receiving increasingly bigger importance, what means general democrati-
zation and pluralization, function of law-governed and social state, human rights
(especially minorities rights), freedoms and all correlated to this.
6 Vojnić, Dragomir: “European integrational processes and the countries in transition - with a
special reference to Croatia and former Yugoslavia”, Conference ISSUE. Single European Market,
paper No. 88, University of Exeter, September 8-11, 1994
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Such standpoints were also expressed at the 13th World Congress of Economists
(September 9-13, 2002 in Lisbon), at which I personally participated. The president
of the European Commission Romano Prodi expressed these points in public, as
well as in talks with representatives of the Croatian delegation, including also the
author of this paper.
Besides it was said that entire level of redistribution to which the European
Union would be obliged in case of admittance of countries candidates would amount
to about 0,25 percent GDP of 15 member countries. It was also said that Croatia
could accelerate its admittance into the European Union very much if it would be
able to fulfil faster the conditions from the Agreement on Stability and Association.
The existing GDP level in relation to average of 15 countries members of the
European Union should not be too big problem (Table 3).
According to criteria from Exeter, Croatia would achieve the level of 50 percent
GDP of the average of countries members of the European Union  not earlier than
in 2015, according to projection from Table 3. According to criteria expressed at
the mentioned World Congress of  economists, the achieved level of development
of Croatian economy should not prevent the admittance of Croatia into the European
Union. At the symposium dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the academician
Jakov Sirotković held at the Faculty of Economics Zagreb on September 19, 2002
I put a question whether these changes of criteria represented a basis for big optimism
in regard to acceleration of admittance of Croatia into the European Union. We
agreed that optimism should stand, but realistically looking, numerous questions
were still open. Without regard to all known (and also uknown problems) our
consideration must start taking into account the fact that the border of the European
Union will reach Zagreb in the foreseeable future. For Croatia would be normal
the decisive orientation to pass this border as soon as possible.
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Table 3.
GDP PER CAPITA AT CURRENT PPPS (EUR/ECU),
FROM 2002 AT CONSTANT PPPS
Izvor: BENCHMARK RESULTS OF THE 1996 EUROSTAT-OECD COMPARISON
BY ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES (preliminary), OECD, 1998; National statistics; WIFO;
WIIW estimates.
Leon Podkaminer et al. Transition Countries in 2002: Losing Steam, Research Reports
No. 285.  July 2002. p. 34
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Besides, it should not be forgotten that economic and the entire science, as
well as all happenings on these spaces (during the reform time) gave considerable
contribution to acceleration of collapse of the Bolshevik option and to the fall of
the Berlin wall. All this especially refers to Croatia and Slovenia. Therefore Croatia
deserves to associate into the European Union much earlier than it has been thought
so far.7
Considering all what has been mentioned that is certainly possible. In his
discussion with Croatian delegation Romano Prodi alluded that our destiny was in
our hands. It remains to be seen how we shall make the most of our advantage. The
Portuguese economists were convincing us that we should do it in very near future.
Twenty years ago Portugal was remarkably bellow the level of the former state,
and now it is remarkably in front of Slovenia.
Instead of concluding considerations
Croatia along to Slovenia belongs to the countries which were best prepared
for transition. Drastic lagging of Croatia behind Slovenia was the consequence of
imposed war and mistakes of entire and economic policy. The consequence of
mistakes of entire policy was creation of political atmosphere which was not
acceptable for international community. Croatia came under less or more shadow
sanctions.
The mistakes of economic policy especially refer to tycoon privatization and
wrong stabilization level. The synthetic expression of cumulated  distortions of
economic policy is development of such model of the economic development which
is based on development of trade and the imports expansion, with completely
neglected industrial policy.
Accelerated growth of GDP, production, exports and employment, appear to
be the main strategic tasks of the new economic policy.
At the beginning of new century, the government of left centre realized, by
combination of measures of economic policy, in the sphere of general restructuring,
as well as in monetary and fiscal sphere, some, but insufficient shifts.
The question of further transformation of the model of economic development
in direction of production development and exports expansion still remains open.
7 Žarko Puhovski, Ivan Prpić, Dragomir Vojnić (Ed.et.al.): Politics and Economics of Transition.
Centre for the Study of the Transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. Zagreb, Informator, 1993.
Dragomir Vojnić: Economics and Politics of Transition, Institute of Economics Zagreb and Informator,
Zagreb. 1993.
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Any similarity to the Argentine syndrom has not been direct danger so far
(regarding foreign exchange and privatization reserves) but all possible conse-
quences should be deliberated in order to undertake adequate measures.
Accelerated integration into the European Union demands both accelerated
GDP growth and accelerated transformation of macroeconomic and macropolitical
environment on fundamentals already accepted by the Agreement on Stabilization
and Association.
At the 13th Congress of Economists (Lisbon 9-13 September, 2002) where
Croatian delegation also participated, it was especially emphasized decisive role
of political criteria (democratization, pluralization, function of law-governed state,
rule of rights, human rights and freedoms) for admittance into the European Union,
what means that the present GDP level of Croatia is not any more such an obstacle
which could not be passed over. The forthcoming years will show whether this is
the basis for optimism.
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EUROPSKI INTEGRACIJSKI PROCESI -
GDJE JE HRVATSKA ?
Sažetak
Činjenica da je prijemom Slovenije granica Europske unije došla u predgrađe Zagreba
opetovano je izazvala diskusiju o razlozima zaostajanja Hrvatske. Autor osnovne razloge
(pored nametnutoga rata) vidi u političkom ozračju koje je bilo neprihvatljivo za
međunarodnu zajednicu. Kao izraz takvoga ozračja pojavile su se velike greške ukupne (B
i H) i ekonomske politike (tajkunska privatizacija i pogrešna razina stabilizacije). Odlučnu
ulogu neprihvatljivog političkog ozračja pokazuje i sama činjenica da su hrvatski i slovenski
ekonomisti zajednički pripremili polazne osnove tranzicije. Slovenija je taj koncept dosljedno
provela, a Hrvatska ga je u potpunosti ignorirala. Drugi val demokratizacije (na početku
stoljeća) stvorio je političko ozračje prihvatljivije za međunarodnu zajednicu i prikladnije
za gospodarski razvitak. Osim određenih pomaka u gospodarskoj sferi, posebno su izrađeni
pomaci u smjeru nešto bržeg priključivanja Europskoj uniji. Ohrabrenje u tom smislu autor
je dobio i u razgovoru s predsjednikom Europske komisije, Romanom Prodijem, za vrijeme
XIII. svjetskog kongresa ekonomista koji je održan u Lisabonu od 9. do 13. rujna 2002.
godine.
